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Zionism, Ottomanism, and the Young 
Turk Revolution 
What Palestinian Jewish Identity Says About Zionist 
Political Separatism in 1908-1912 
Dimitri Savidis ’18 
I. Introduction 
The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 led to Sultan Abdul Hamid II restoring the 
Ottoman constitution of 1876, announcing elections to a new Ottoman Parliament, 
and promising political and social reforms, which included individual freedoms for 
Ottoman citizens and regulation of all government bodies. Like communities in 
other parts of the empire, the ethno-religious communities in Palestine – which 
included Muslims, Christians, and Jews – greeted these political changes and 
promises for social reform with enthusiasm as they believed the revolution would 
bring about an era of equality, protection, and cultural and economic prosperity for 
all of the empire’s citizens. 
In fact, the notion of Ottoman citizenship took on a more significant meaning 
in the aftermath of the revolution. The empire’s previously subjugated communities 
saw the emergence of representative national politics as an opportunity to reclaim 
their strength to not only rejuvenate their people, but to also contribute positively to 
the progress of the Ottoman nation. Central to this idea of imperial citizenship was 
an emerging sentiment of comradery or “love and brotherhood” amongst Ottomans 
that was meant to transcend the borders of the millet system – the network of ethno-
religious confessional communities that traditionally dominated local social and 
political life in the empire. Within this context, the revolution of 1908 inspired 
optimism for “liberty, fraternity [and] justice” throughout the empire, resulting, at 
least temporarily, in the hope for a shared pan-imperial, national identity termed 
“Ottomanism.”  
The development of the Zionist project in Palestine had the potential to run up 
against the emergence of the idea of Ottomanism in the immediate post-
revolutionary period. As described by historian Walter Laqueur, Zionism, by the turn 
of the century, could be best characterized as a project focused on creating a 
particular society in the land of Israel – one that was undoubtedly nationalistic but 
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concentrated on the benefits of redeeming the Jewish people through labor.1 Taking 
this basic characterization of the Zionist movement at the time into account, there is 
potential for both the compatibility and complete incompatibility of Zionism and 
Ottomanism from what defined such a national Jewish project. More specifically, the 
question of compatibility lies on whether or not such a national plan predominantly 
embodied separatist political goals and aspirations.   
Michelle Campos is an influential scholar of Ottomanism and the Jewish 
experience in Palestine in the immediate post-1908 period. She views the relationship 
between Ottoman Palestinian Jews and European Jewish settlers as one of 
dichotomy. The former were steadfast in their beliefs of a Jewish nation in Palestine 
with political separatism as their ultimate goal, whereas the latter were devoid of 
political separatist aspirations and saw a Jewish national movement as being solely a 
Jewish cultural revival project while maintaining their Ottoman identity.2 However, 
such a dichotomy may not have existed as distinctively as Campos may perceive. 
Arieh Saposnik proposes an array of ideas that question (1) the political separatist 
aims that Campos attributes to European Jewish settlers, (2) the tension between 
Ottoman Jews and European Jewish immigrants over the adoption of Ottomanism, 
and (3) the potential that – if political separatist aims were predominant in European 
Zionist thought within Palestine – the Ottoman Jews did not seek to use 
Ottomanism in the same practical fashion in which Campos claims the European 
Jewish settlers had done.3 
I aim to present the divergent perspectives in the narrow and unique 
historiography of Palestinian Jewry and Ottomanism to provide validity to the 
distinct conclusions that Campos and Saposnik make in their analyses of Zionism in 
the immediate post-1908 period. In doing so, I wish to answer the question of 
whether political aspirations were a predominant part of the Jewish national project 
at this time within Palestine by analyzing how various Palestinian Jewish groups 
identified themselves against both their fellow co-religionist and their Ottoman 
brother. In other words, I aim to answer whether the aspirations to establish an 
independent, sovereign Jewish homeland can be taken for granted in the post-1908 
period from the perspective of the various groups of Jews in Palestine. 
To achieve this end, I plan to first define Ottomanism within the context of the 
promises for social and political reform ushered by the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908. Next, I will present Campos’s view on the relationship between Ottomanism, 
Zionism, and the various Jewish groups in Palestine to establish a perspective on 
what is traditionally defined as Zionism and Ottomanism to Palestinian Jewry in this 
 
1 Walter Lacqueur, A History of Zionism: From the French Revolution to the Establishment of the State of Israel 
(Shocken Books, 1972), 297. 
2 Michelle Campos, Between “Beloved Ottomania” and “The Land of Israel”: The Struggle over Ottomanism and 
Zionism among Palestine’s Sephardi Jews, 1908-13 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 466. 
3 Arieh Bruce Saposnik, Becoming Hebrew: The Creation of a Jewish National Culture in Ottoman Palestine 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), 178.  
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period. Campos’s work remains foundational in a narrow historiography on the 
relationship between Palestinian Jewry and Ottomanism. Her characterization of 
Ottomanism has generally been accepted.   
However, while there is little disagreement over her characterization of 
Ottomanism, doubt has been cast over her conclusions on the relationship between 
Ottomanism and the various Jewish groups in Palestine. Saposnik’s critique of 
Campos’s analysis offers more of a list of touchpoints of contention than a real 
counterargument to Campos’s claims on this front. I will therefore clarify Saposnik’s 
viewpoint solely as a gateway for introducing commentary and analysis from other 
historians that may shed light on the divergence. These analyses will provide a 
perspective on relations between Palestinian Jewry and critical components of 
Ottomanism that will offer unique insight into the debate. I will conclude with an 
overall assessment of the historiography to assess the predominance of political 
aspirations in Zionist thought as it pertained to the various Jewish groups within 
Palestine.4 
II. Understanding Ottomanism – Hurriyya, Citizenship, and Brotherhood 
The political and social reforms and promises for equality amongst all Ottoman 
citizens that arose from the success of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 
descended from a liberal sentiment that first materialized in the mid-1800s through 
the Tanzimat Reforms. These reforms were significant in introducing the idea of 
nationhood, which was at the core of the Ottomanist ideology after the 1908 
revolution. Recognizing the demise of the empire, Ottoman subjects were able to 
instill checks on the absolutism of the sultan’s power, invoking traditional Islamic 
thought on justice, public good, and consultation while emphasizing the “will of the 
people-nation.”5 With the suspension of the parliament and constitution in the late 
19th century, the return of these checks on power also represented the arrival of a 
nation to its people. It represented an essential step in the transition from empire to 
a republic.   
In her work on the relationship between the Sephardim, the Ashkenazim, and 
Ottomanism, Campos quotes a prominent Zionist radical in Palestine on the 
Ottoman Jews’ affinity with the idea of Ottoman brotherhood as a “tendency to be 
more Marxist than Marx.” However, this commentator underestimated the 
significance of the revolution and the Ottomans’ appreciation for their newfound 
liberty, or hurriyya (Ara.). Official celebration ceremonies were scheduled throughout 
 
4 Hereafter, I will refer to European Jewish settlers in Palestine as the Ashkenazim, native Ottoman 
Jewish citizens as the Sephardim, and the collective of Jews in Palestine (Ashkenazim and Sephardim 
collectively) as Palestinian Jewry.  
5 Michelle Campos, Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth Century Palestine 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 48. 
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Palestine in the aftermath of the revolution, and unofficial parades and celebrations 
erupted for weeks throughout the region. One observer in Jerusalem noted, “Cries 
of ‘Liberty, equality, fraternity!’ [were] heard from thousands of people, and ‘love and 
brotherhood’ sang between all the sons of the different communities in Jerusalem.”6 
The future Christian parliamentary candidate of Beirut, Suleiman al-Bustani, waxed 
lyrically, “If you had seen them on the day of the constitution the imam and the priest 
and the rabbi – all were united with tears of joy.” Another article noted that “the 
Muslim shook hands with the Christian, and the Kurd reconciled with the Armenian, 
and the Turk hugged the Arab.”7 
The Jerusalem crowd, which most likely contained only a minimal amount of 
Ottoman Turkish speakers, only positively reacted to the Ottoman governor’s 
proclamation of the reforms when he mentioned hürriyet (Ott. Turk.). When 
Jerusalem notable Sa`id al-Husayni translated the declaration into Arabic, he linked 
– as did others – the imminent political changes with the economic revival and social 
renewal that was expected to follow throughout the empire. Some of these were 
envisioned in the form of new schools, increased commerce, and improved public 
works projects among others.8  
In this way, newfound liberty not only meant equality among Ottoman citizens 
but also the expectation of tangible improvements within the empire – a 
responsibility held not only by the state but also by Ottoman citizens. Campos 
succinctly explains: 
The theater of revolutionary brotherhood was premised on the expectation that all 
Ottomans would share not only rights, but also obligations, and that all communities – 
being recast as Ottoman first and foremost – would work for the public good in a 
republican spirit of shared citizenship.9 
This spirit of shared citizenship ultimately led to a sense of comradery among 
Ottoman citizens as they believed that they were handed the keys to the imperial 
shackles with which the sultan had once restrained them. The term Ottoman, rather 
than being used to identify the imperial bureaucratic ruling class, now became a self-
identifier for Ottoman citizens because of their shared experiences under a corrupt, 
unjust, and unchecked dynasty and their commitment to improving their homeland 
through the newly-acquired political powers.10  
Recognizing the underlining unifying force of Ottomanism in this way is 
important because it emphasizes the civic nature of Ottoman brotherhood that 
developed through the liberation of the 1908 revolution. This imperial collective 
recalled its base in political membership and citizenship rights. 11  It was a 
 
6 Campos (2011), 29. 
7 Ibid., 75. 
8 Ibid., 31. 
9 Ibid., 82. 
10 Ibid., 75.  
11 Ibid., 77. 
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brotherhood that had been born of the revolution – through the constitution and 
obligations of citizenship. David Yellin, a Jewish celebrant in Jerusalem, later 
explained:   
[The revolution] caused the whole nation to be brothers in one endeavor – the success 
of the homeland and its people and the pride of membership in one family: the Ottoman 
family. And who among us does not remember how the fire of brotherhood was kindled 
suddenly in the hearts of all the Ottomans, and how the whole nation experienced in one 
stroke…the feeling of unity to endeavor for the good of the country and the success of 
the state.12 
The Jerusalem-based Muslim lawyer Ragheb al-Imam reiterated the civic-based 
nature of Ottoman brotherhood, explaining, “The Ottoman races who were of 
different nations entered through the melting pot of the constitution and came out 
as one bullion of pure gold which is Ottomanism, which unites the hearts of the 
umma and brings together their souls.”13 
III. Ottomanism and Palestinian Jewry 
A. Realities of Ottomanism   
While the civic nature of Ottomanism is a near certainty, Campos presents three 
different facts of Ottomanism that existed at the same time and that have far-
reaching implications for how Palestinian Jewry would come to compromise their 
Zionist and Ottomanist sentiments. The first reality is the Ottomanism that has 
political roots but also attempts to take the place of the ethno-religious identities that 
had defined Ottoman subjects for centuries. This form of Ottomanism was most 
prevalent in the very aftermath of the revolution, and perhaps was a result of overjoy 
and unrealistic expectations for the extent of social and economic progress. For 
example, in the wake of the revolution, the American consul in Beirut reported:  
Moslems and Christians publicly embrace each other, protesting that henceforth they are 
brethren, that there are Christians, Moslems, Jews, Mitwalehs, etc., no more, only loyal 
Ottoman subjects standing shoulder to shoulder prepared to fight for the liberties 
granted by the Sultan, long live the Sultan!14   
Such an interpretation may be viewed as extreme, as it was formulated mainly during 
times of high spirits and ignored the realities of the impermeable millet system on 
which the second and third facts of Ottomanism are based. Nonetheless, the 
emergence of such a sentiment – even if only temporary – is telling of the vigor of 
revolution in creating a shared Ottomanist sentiment.   
The second and third realities of Ottomanism were unable to deconstruct the 
various ethno-religious identities of the empire, but instead, function in tandem with 
them. In this sense, Ottomanism takes on a wholly civil and political meaning but 
 
12 Campos (2011), 78. 
13 Campos, (2011), 78. 
14 Campos (2011), 76. 
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still serves as a national identity. Christian Arab writer Adib Ishaq articulated 
Ottomanism at the time in neither lingual, religious, nor ethnic terms but rather as a 
collective agreement of belonging to one nation. In his words, “The ‘Ottoman 
nationality’ covers all the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, in Europe as well as 
in Asia, whether they be, by origin, Turks, Arabs, or Tartars.”15 In comparing the 
Ottomans’ nationalization and liberalization project with that of the ethnically, 
religiously, and linguistically French nation, Rashid Rida, editor of al-Manar, reiterated 
this reality of Ottomanism at the time:  
But we, the Ottomans, have already united from the different nationalities in a way that 
has not yet happened in any other kingdom. We are different in race, descent, language, 
religion, sect, education, and culture…but despite that we demand equality and celebrate 
its granting in a general covenant and in the places of worship and no doubt in this 
magazine.16   
For Rida and his audience, the emergence of Ottomanism was the conscious 
adoption of a political project of an empire that was to be united while maintaining 
its ethno-religious and linguistic heterogeneity. This understanding was echoed by 
early twentieth century Ottoman dictionaries which emphasized the distinction 
between the term millet to denote the empire’s religious communities and the terms 
ümmet or kavim to denote the Ottoman nation. A dictionary at the time noted that “it 
is absurd to speak of an Ottoman millet. Rather it is correct to speak of an Ottoman 
ümmet. Because the different nations and peoples form a single ümmet called 
Ottoman.” These commentaries make clear the compatibility of millet identity with 
Ottomanism and the acknowledgment of the coexistence of different ethno-religious 
identities within Ottoman nationalism.   
Finally, the third reality of Ottomanism is best characterized as the demise of 
the previous two facts by the increasing empowerment and rigidity of the millet 
system. This intensified intercommunal conflicts within the national political project. 
Such strife arose in parliamentary elections and appeals to Ottoman officials. 
Religious communities attempted to secure an influential position of power in the 
new political order to provide greater rights and benefits for themselves in the name 
of equality. As Campos explains, “Rights and privileges were measured not only 
against absolute standards of Ottomanist civic identity but also, more important, 
against those enjoyed by the other ethnic and religious groups in the empire.”17 
Therefore, this period provided an opportunity for ethno-religious groups to quickly 
mobilize and strategize to assure that their communities received fair share of the 
benefits promised by the revolution.   
In the wake of the revolution, the young Jewish journalist Avraham Elmaliach 
 
15 Campos (2011), 67. 
16 Campos (2011), 59. 
17 Campos (2011), 145. 
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perfectly captured this reality of Ottomanism when he wrote, “Our homeland has 
returned to rebirth…and therefore our brothers the Jewish people, residents of 
Turkey, will endeavor through the freedoms given to us to bring closer all that is 
good and useful for our homeland.”18 In this he reiterated the need to “redeem the 
Jews’ honor” by electing Jews to Ottoman parliament. A writer for the Hebrew 
newspaper Paradise echoed this sentiment by explaining that the reason for this 
demand, he wrote, was “so that we will not be considered less than the 
Christians…Forward, brothers, a little bit of force and everything can be 
accomplished. In order to save our honor before everything!” 19  By 1912, such 
community-centric sentiment was also shared by the empire’s Arab-speaking peoples 
who envisioned a united, yet highly decentralized empire. While Ottomanism 
manifested in specific instances as optimistic cooperation between all peoples of the 
empire, its downfall was the reality that it could not deter the exclusionary forces of 
the existing millet system. 
B. Campos’s Viewpoint and Saposnik’s Critique 
Understanding these differing realities of Ottomanism is vital to Campos’s 
analysis of the way the different ethnic groups within Palestinian Jewry struggled with 
Zionism and Ottomanism. 20  Campos divides Palestinian Jewry between the 
immigrating Ashkenazim and the Sephardim, the native Ottoman Jewish population. 
Campos claims that for the Ashkenazim of the “New Yishuv”:  
Participation in the new Ottoman political system was a good strategy, but it was devoid 
of any inherent value. In this utilitarian approach, the political enfranchisement of 
Palestinian Jews would allow them to push for separatist Zionist aims within the 
framework of the expected proto-nationalistic campaigns for decentralization.21 
According to Campos, the Ashkenazim in Palestine were committed mainly to 
separatist political aims and accepted Ottomanism nominally only as a means to a 
separatist political end.  On the other end, Campos divides the Sephardim into two 
camps: Ottomanist who viewed any national Jewish project as incompatible with 
Ottomanism and Ottoman Zionists who are characterized by their commitment to 
Cultural Hebraism within the Ottoman political and civic framework. In this view, 
the Sephardic camps follow the first and second realities of Ottomanism, 
respectively, set out in the previous section. As the Ottomanist poet Reuben Qattan 
wrote to readers of Ladino newspaper El Liberal:  
Before everything we should live Ottoman lives, cultivate the language of the Ottomans, 
form an integral part of the Ottoman nation, and sincerely love the Ottoman patria. We 
 
18 Campos (2011), 145.  
19 Ibid., 147.  
20 I am using the term “ethnic” here to mean Ashkenazi or Sephardic.  
21 Campos (2005), 466. 
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are Ottomans and nothing else…To work and to die for Turkey – that should be our 
only and sacred duty.22  
In response to Qattan, Ottoman Zionist writer Yehuta Burla reassured, “In short, it 
will become clear to us how we must be Ottomans and something else in addition.”23  
Burla, like his other co-Ottoman Zionists, was committed to Ottomanism as a 
civic and political project and believed it to be in line with the aim of rejuvenating 
the Jewish people. Campos coined the term cultural Hebraism in describing this unique 
mix of ideologies. Cultural Hebraism was a response to perceived communal 
stagnation, calling to modernize the Jewish community while incorporating an 
authentic element of Jewish culture and identity that harkened back to the Jewish 
people’s Hebraic roots. Burla and other Ottoman Zionists believed that “the rebirth 
of the Jewish people in its cultural, social, and economic dimensions would work to 
the benefit of the empire at large,” touching upon an Ottomanist obligation to assist 
in improving the empire.24 
 In Becoming Hebrew: The Creation of a Jewish National Culture in Ottoman Palestine, 
Arieh Saposnik does not substantially challenge, but only puts into question the stark 
dichotomy that Campos presents. First, Saposnik questions the purely political 
separatist aims that Campos attributes to Ashkenazim, by stating:  
Most of Palestine’s Zionists – whether they were focused principally on the production 
of a new national music or art, on the Hebrew language, or on ‘Hebrew labor’ – were 
only remotely concerned during these years with the kinds of political objectives that 
might have exercised Zionists in Cologne and Berlin.25 
Saposnik further asserts that, instead of political separatist ambitions, the 
Ashkenazim were focused on cultural Hebraism just as much as the Sephardim:  
The Zionism of Palestine’s Ashkenazi nationalizing elite – no less than that of their 
Ottoman Sephardic counterparts – was often aimed principally at precisely the kind of 
‘cultural Hebraism’ Campos presents as a unique feature of the Sephardim.26  
Finally, Saposnik proposes that – contrary to Campos’s claim on the authenticity of 
the Sephardim’s attraction to Ottomanism – there is little reason to believe that 
Ottoman Zionists were not consciously hiding political separatist ambitions 
themselves:  
While there were undoubtedly tactical reasons for the choice of such language by 
European Zionists, there is little reason to suppose that such tactical considerations were 
entirely absent when pro-Zionist Ottoman supporters denied that Zionism had any anti-
Ottoman aims or repercussions.27  
I do not intend on answering Saposnik’s questions and doubts directly. Instead, I aim 
 
22 Campos (2005), 471. 
23 Campos (2005), 472. 
24 Campos (2005), 470. 
25 Saposnik, 179. 
26 Saposnik, 179. 
27 Saposnik, 179. 
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to present unique historiography on the intersection between Zionism and 
Ottomanism that diverts from Campos’s traditional views, to shed light on the issue 
of separatist political aspirations of Palestinian Jewry that is apparent in the different 
perspectives offered by Campos’s work and Saposnik’s questions.   
IV. A Unique Historiography 
A. “Impossible Is Not Ottoman” – An Ashkenazi Ottomanist 
Samuel Dolbee and Shay Hazkani, in their article “‘Impossible Is Not Ottoman’: 
Menashe Meirovitch, ‘Isa al-‘Isa, and Imperial Citizenship In Palestine,” explore a 
covert partnership between a prominent Zionist agronomist, Menash Meirovitch, 
and the Christian Arab editor of the newspaper Filastin, ‘Isa al-‘Isa, a founding father 
of Palestinian nationalism. Under the literary guise of an Arab Muslim peasant called 
Abu Ibrahim, the two men produced a series of Arabic-language columns in 1911–
1912 that exhibited Campos’s exact definition of Ottoman citizenship – an effort to 
spur infrastructure and public works improvements through an open dialogue and 
pressure in the press, in the name of equality for all Ottoman citizens. More 
importantly, it sheds light on the Ottomanist aspirations of an Ashkenazi Jew, 
Menashe Meirovitch, and the motivations for an Arab Christian to collaborate with 
a potential Zionist.    
Under the guise of Abu Ibrahim, the Russian-born Ashkenazi Jew Menashe 
Meirovitch presents himself as a Muslim Arab peasant and focuses his literary 
advocacy on improving the lives of the peasants. He calls for better roads, well-
trained veterinarians, modern agricultural machinery, and state-sponsored forestry in 
the name of strengthening the Ottoman Empire.28 Both men were committed to the 
goal of improving the standard of living in Palestine through modernization. In 
Meirovitch, al-‘Isa found an expert in agronomy that would be able to make salient 
and knowledgeable arguments for the improvement of the land. When al-‘Isa initially 
approached Meirovitch about the partnership, he reportedly admitted, “You know 
the nature of the land, the conditions of its inhabitants.” In al-‘Isa, Meirovitch found 
a public platform to voice his expertise. He responded, “But, you know, first of all, 
I live in a colony, far from politics…And third, as a Jew, it would be impossible for 
me not to touch upon our conditions and what we were able to do in this land for 
the thirty years of our existence.”29As for the necessity of the guise of Abu Ibrahim, 
both men understood that Palestine’s population of majority Muslim peasants would 
not be receptive to the advocacy of an Arab Christian and Ashkenazi Jew.   
The divergence from Campos’s traditional Ashkenazi-Anti-Ottomanist 
narrative is evident: an Ashkenazi Jew using a literary guise to make claims upon the 
 
28 Samuel Dolbee and Shay Hazkani, “‘Impossible Is Not Ottoman’: Menashe Meirovitch, ‘Isa al-‘Isa, 
and Imperial Citizenship in Palestine,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 47 (2015), 242. 
29 Dolbee and Hazkani, 249. 
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Ottoman government and call for unity among the empire’s different communities 
through the freedom of the press to improve his new homeland’s condition. 
However, Dolbee and Hazkani’s analysis gives us the opportunity to dive deeper. As 
Campos characterizes Ottoman brotherhood as a theatrical outwardly performance, 
Dolbee and Hazkani point out that:  
Our Ottoman brothers did almost the opposite. They revised and published articles 
collaboratively while erasing any evidence of personal connection. The product of their 
imperial citizenship – the columns – may have been public, but its input – their 
brotherhood – was private.30 
One could argue that Meirovitch’s “obedience” to Ottomanism could have been a 
matter of practical strategy to achieve Zionist political goals. In response, Dolbee 
and Hazkani would argue against such a claim because “their partnership involved 
not the betrayal of a sacred national cause but rather the mutual pursuit of modernist 
goals”31 – an aim that is wholly Ottomanist by Campos’s definition.  Also, Dolbee 
and Hazkani note that Meirovitch received no funding from Zionist organizations 
to plant stories of unity in Filastin to curb emerging anti-Semitic sentiment. This 
undermines the possibility that Meirovitch’s actions were motivated by pragmatism 
to achieve alleged Zionist separatist aims.  
Finally, Dolbee and Hazkani profile al-‘Isa as having close relations to the 
Decentralization Party, which the authors claim “viewed the Zionists as comrades 
due to what they saw as the region’s need for the ‘capital and energy’ that Jewish 
immigrants could provide.”32 This affiliation was given greater credibility when al-
‘Isa complained in his memoir that the exodus of the Jews from Jaffa immediately 
after World War I had decimated the local economy. This is significant because it 
reveals that Arabs of the Decentralization Party – a party that itself was on the cusp 
of betraying Ottoman political rule but still viewed its political future under the 
Ottoman rule – saw their interests at least somewhat aligned with those of the 
Zionists. I would conclude that for this alignment to be a reality, Zionist separatist 
aims must not have yet been as apparent as traditionally believed.   
B. “Rethinking the Yishuv and Ottomanization” – Ottomanism as an End for the Yishuv 
In his article “Rethinking the Concept of Ottomanization: The Yishuv in the 
Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908,” Yuval Ben-Bassat argues that 
the pursuit of Jewish nationalism within the Ottoman framework was largely 
accepted among wide segments of the yishuv, the body of Jews living in the land of 
Israel. More importantly, he asserts that support for Ottomanization in the Hebrew 
press “represented a genuine feeling which prevailed in the yishuv at the time, and was 
 
30 Dolbee and Hazkani, 244. 
31 Dolbee and Hazkani, 247. 
32 Dolbee and Hazkani, 248. 
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a far cry from being merely a tactical stance or an effort to temporarily conceal the 
true aims of Zionism in order to appease the Ottoman government.”33 His argument 
is based on the rhetoric of four major newspapers that represent the main segments 
of the yishuv: conservative Ashkenazi newspaper Havatselet, Eliezer Ben-Yehudah’s 
ha-Tsvi which enjoyed a large audience from the colonizers and supporters of the first 
aliyah, the first wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine, the second aliyah’s ha-Po’el 
ha-Tsa’ir, and the Sephardic Ha-Herut.   
In the wake of the 1908 revolution, the question of Ottomanization for 
immigrating Jewish settlers dominated most Zionist conversations. Ben-Yehuda’s 
Ashkenazi-backed ha-Tsvi ignited a pro-Ottomanization discourse that not only 
diverged from the traditional Ashkenazi-Anti-Ottomanist narrative as proposed by 
Campos, but also persuaded other segments of the yishuv to follow its lead toward 
Ottomanization. Ben-Yehuda called for Ottomanization to “convince the 
government that the members of the yishuv were loyal citizens, and allow them to 
take an active part in political processes in the Empire, influence the future of 
Palestine, and freely pursue their national project.”34  
Ben-Yehuda recognized the ethno-religious heterogeneity of the empire and 
found it a suitable framework for pursuing the Jewish national goals. He saw no 
contradiction between supporting Jewish nationalism and remaining loyal to the 
empire because he perceived nationalist aims within a future federal Ottoman 
political framework. He argued that Jews living in Ottoman Palestine would be able 
to retain their Jewish identity and support the federal system just like Jewish 
Americans had done in the United States. He proclaimed:  
The call to accept Ottoman citizenship does not mean assimilation…What is the 
meaning of the term Ottoman? It is not the name for a nationality, a race, or a nation in 
the natural sense of the word…It is a political term, no more…Jews, be Ottoman! Be 
the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, so you can be Hebrew in the land of your 
forefathers.35  
According to Ben-Yehuda, the Ottoman Empire was to become a mosaic of 
different nations under Ottoman political authority, giving the Jewish people the 
opportunity to revive Jewish nationalism in their ancient homeland. Here, the term 
“nationalism” is used by Ben-Yehuda in a cultural, social, and economic context, 
devoid of irredentist political sentiment.36   
Ben-Bassat claims that, following ha-Tsvi’s example, the Ashkenazi newspaper 
Havatselet stated that under the post-revolutionary regime it was “possible to pursue 
 
33 Yuval Ben-Bassat, “Rethinking the Concept of Ottomanization: The Yishuv in the Aftermath of the 
Young Turk Revolution of 1908,” Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 3 (2009), 461.  
34 Ben-Bassat, 466. 
35 Ben-Bassat, 466. 
36 Ben-Bassat, 466. 
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the Jewish national revival in Eretz-Yisrael and concomitantly preserve the religious 
character of the yishuv.”37 Ben-Bassat concludes this is a clear representation of the 
“old yishuv’s” belief in the possibility of implementing the Jewish national project 
within the new political reality of the post-revolutionary period.  
Finally, Ben-Bassat argues that, although hesitant at first, the Ashkenazi ha-Po’el 
ha-Tsa’ir accepted Ottomanization after the revolution because it believed that the 
future of politics in the empire rested in a decentralized federal system similar to what 
Ben-Yehuda and the Arabs’ Decentralization Party had envisioned at the time.38 
However, unlike ha-Tsvi’s emphasis on cooperating with the current Ottoman 
officials, ha-Po’el ha-Tsa’ir found it more practical to cooperate with their Palestinian 
neighbors with whom they would be sharing national borders within the broader 
empire. Naturally, the Sephardic Ha-Herut was inclined to support Ottomanization 
without Ben-Yehuda’s persuasion. 
C. Zionism as told by Rashid Rida 
In his article “Zionism as told by Rashid Rida,” Uriya Shavit examines and 
explains Muhammad Rashid Rida’s radical shifts in views on Zionism from 
admiration in the late 19th century to revulsion by the end of the post-revolutionary 
period. The prominent Ottoman Muslim thinker and al-Manar editor underwent a 
transformation in thought that does not align with trends in popular Arab thinking 
of Zionism. Similarly, the accuracy with which he predicts the future of Zionism in 
Palestine begs the question if the factors of pre-destined Zionist sovereignty were in 
place in Palestine by the 1908 revolution.  
Shavit’s analysis shows that by 1902, Rida had recognized the cultural and 
educational strides Jews had made in Europe, had defined the Jewish people as a 
“mighty nation,” and “underlined the plausibility of the plan to take over 
Palestine.”39 In the wake of the 1908 revolution, Rida was convinced that the Jews 
had orchestrated the movement, had plans to take over al-Aqsa mosque as their first 
step in eradicating Muslims and Christians from Palestine and wielded unmatched 
influence in the Committee of Union and Progress.40 
It is important to remember that during this period, the sentiments of 
Ottomanist brotherhood and shared citizenship were running high. Therefore, I 
present this article of Rida’s transformation not as a gauge for popular opinion in the 
empire on what Zionism represented. But rather as a counterweight or reminder that 
although the post-revolutionary period may have masked Zionist separatist 
aspirations, hints of political aims in general Zionist thought did exist. Compared to 
Dolbee and Hazkani and Ben-Bassat, Rida appears as a paranoid conspiracy theorist. 
 
37 Ben-Bassat, 467. 
38 Ben-Bassat, 468. 
39 Uriya Shavit, “Zionism as told by Rashid Rida,” The Journal of Israeli History 34 (2015), 25. 
40 Shavit, 30. 
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However, as Rida’s fears of a Zionist rule in Palestine became a reality in the 
aftermath of the empire’s fall, his paranoia certainly sheds light on the validity of 
Campos’s claims of a continued existence of separatist aims throughout the post-
revolutionary period. 
V. Conclusion   
Given the benefit of hindsight, historians today are naturally inclined to view 
the Zionist project in Palestine as having a continuous stream of separatist thought 
and sentiment, even throughout the post-revolutionary period. For the same reason, 
historians may also be inclined to disprove such a sentiment for the sake of providing 
an alternate viewpoint of a narrative that is often taken for granted. My aim in this 
essay was to investigate this dilemma and present the traditional views through 
Campos’s work along with differing or unique perspectives on the issue of how 
Palestinian Jewry reconciled Zionist and Ottomanist identities and what this 
reconciliation said about the existence of separatist political aims in Zionist thought.   
The evidence provided by Campos’s dissenters did not satisfy the need to prove 
intent – a near impossibility for any historical account. Although the dissenters 
indeed confirmed that the Ashkenazi were at least publicly willing to support 
Ottomanism and express an authentic belief in the alignment of Jewish nationalism 
and Ottomanism, the fact that separatist political aims eventually superseded other 
political ties or affinities naturally puts into question the real intent of Zionists in the 
post-revolutionary period. Certainly, the question of separatist political aims of 
Palestinian Jewry in the post-revolutionary period is an area that has been 
underdeveloped and warrants additional examination to track Zionism’s 
development in such a unique, optimistic and yet disappointing period in Ottoman 
history.
